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upon the Ohio courts is at best uncertain. However, in "an attenrlpt t6
evaluate the effect upon Ohio law of those cases in other jurisdictions which
held charitable institutions vicariously liable for the toris of their employees,
reference is made to other areas of publc policy in which the Ohio Supreme
Court has seen fit to reject established rules of law to conform with the
statements of public policy of other jurisdictions. For example, although
Ohio had long denied a husband or wife recovery from his spouse in tort,4 7
this rule was completely discarded in a recent case.48 Also, the right of a
child to sue a parent in tort has recently been'upheld49 in Ohio in recogni-
tion of the modern tendency to allow such suits. 0
Both of these decisions were based upon considerations of public policy,
and in each of these areas the Ohio Supreme Court has seen fit to terminate
an existing immunity largely upon the basis of a public policy manifest in
other jurisdictions. Why should not the immunity of charitable institutions
be rejected upon the basis of a similar public policy to that which has been
noted by the supreme court in the husband-wife and parent-child areas?
Such a result would be in the interests of justice.
"Charity suffereth long and is kind, but.., it cannot be careless. When
it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes actionable wrongdoin&""
BERTARD ALLEN BERuMAN
Right of Purchaser in Sale of Defective House
M ORE AMERICANS are purchasing houses today than ever before, and
even the unprecedented building "boom" has failed to satisfy the demand
for housing. In some instances the purchaser discovers that due to inferior
materials or inefficient workmanship in the construction of a new house, or
in the case of an older house due to damage or disrepair, the house is defec-
tive in one or more respects. It is the purpose of this article to discuss the
rights and the remedies of the purchaser of a defective house.
NATURE OF GRANTOR'S LIABILITY
While the ancient maxim "caveat emptor" is an anachronism in the
law of the sale of chattels, it has tenaciously survived as to real estate.2 The
' VOLD, SALXs 445 (1931).
'Collier v. Harkness, 26 Ga. 362 (1858); Gimblen v. Harrison, 2 Sneed 315 (Ky.
1804); Lewy v. Clark, 128 N.Y. Misc. 16, 217 N.Y. Supp. 185 (1926); Smith v.
Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925); Hoskins v. Woodham, [1938] 1 All
E.R. 692 (K.B.D.); 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs 2602 (1936); 29 HAISBURY'S
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maxim has been applied not only to title3 but to the quality and condition4
of the real estate, and to both leased5 and purchasedO realty. Although
"caveat emptor" is the initial response to a complaining purchaser, it does
not preclude further inquiry, and the law does recognize various grounds
upon which liability may be imposed. Liability of the grantor for damages
resulting from some defect in a house may be predicated on the breach of an
express contract, the breach of an express or implied warranty, negligence or
fraud.
At the outset it must be noted that there is a judicially recognized dis-
tinction between the sale of an existing house, new or used, and the sale of
a house not yet existing or in the process of construction.7 This distinction
becomes especially important in the determination of liability for breach
of contract and for breach of warranty. Following is a discussion of the
grantor's liability under each of the four possible theories.
1. Express Contract
A contract for the sale of an existing house is considered one for the sale
of real estate and is governed by the ordinary principles of contract law.8
A contract for the sale of a house not yet existing or in the process of
construction may be analyzed as if there are two severable agreements, viz.,
the sale of the land and the agreement to complete the house.9 This latter
agreement constitutes a building or construction contract.10
LAWS OF ENGLAND 249 (2d ed. 1938); Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness
of Land for a Particular Purpose, PROCEEDINGS, AMEmCAN BAR AssociATIoN
SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRusT LAW 4 (1952).
'Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740 (1941).
'Parker v. Moulton, 114 Mass. 99 (1873); Lewy v. Clark, 128 N.Y. Misc. 16, 217
N.Y. Supp. 185 (1926).
'There is authority distinguishing unfurnished from furnished premises to the effect
that in a lease of the latter there is an implied warranty of habitability. Ingalls v.
Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); see Note, 4 A.L.R. 1453, 1456 (1918).
*The leading English case of Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 68, 152 Eng. Rep. 1114
(Ex. 1843), involved the lease of a house which was so infested with bugs that it
was unfit for habitation. An implied warranty as to fitness for habitation was re-
jected by the court. This rule has been followed unanimously in subsequent English
and American decisions involving both the lease and sale of real estate. 1 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 149 (3d ed. 1939) and cases cited therein. For a case recogniz-
ing an essential difference between the relationship of lessor-lessee and grantor-
grantee, see Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925).
'Oliver v. Hartzell, 170 Ark. 512, 280 S.W. 979 (1926); Perry v. Sharon Develop-
ment Co., Ltd., [1937], 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.); Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd.,
[1931], 2 K.B. 113.
'Kutter v. Smith, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 491 (1865).
'Whaley v. Milton- Construct. & Supply Co., 241 S.W.2d 23, (Mo. App. 1951);
Raab v. Beatty, 96 Pa. Super. 574 (1929); Haynes v. Morton, 32 Tenn. App. 251,
222 S.W.2d 389 (1949). This situation is identical in the eyes of the law to the
traditional practice of hiring a builder to erect a house on one's own lot.
" Such a contract, "or as it is otherwise termed, a working contract, is one under
(Slimmer
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The measure of damages recoverable for a defect due to the breach of
an express provision in a building contract is the cost of repairing or com-
pleting the house to make it conform to the contract, unless the cost of cor-
recting the defect would be greatly out of proportion to the increment in
value to be attained.! If such be the case the purchaser is entitled as dam-
ages to the difference in value of the house as it is and that which it should
have been according to the contract.1 2
2. Warranty
While warranty is a word of many connotations, it is traditionally con-
sidered a collateral agreement, referring to the main subject matter of a
contract.1 3 Warranties are either express or implied:'4
In the sense here used an express warranty is a representation or affirma-
tion of a fact which naturally would, and in fact does, induce one to act in
making a purchase.1 5 No special form of words is necessary to create an
express warranty,'0 but mere sales talk or "puffing' is not a warranty.' In
determining what words constitute an express warranty, there is no distinc-
tion between a sale of chattels and a sale of real estate.' In response to a
specific question by a prospective lessee, an affirmative answer that drains
are in good order, when in fact they are not, subjects the lessor to damages
for breach of warranty.'0 Unlike an action for deceit, it is unnecessary to
prove the warrantor's intent or his knowledge of the falsity of the repre-
sentation.20
An implied warranty is a promise, arising independently of the contract,
imposed by law because of the conduct of the parties.2 ' In the sale of an
existing house, new or used, the law is well settled that there are no implied
which work or labor is to be performed in the erection, construction, or repair of
some building, edifice, structure, or other work." 9 C.J. 693 (1916).
U Jacob v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 130 NE. 933 (1921); Sadler v. Bromberg, 62
Ohio L Abs. 73 (1950).
"IMadisonville v. Rosser & Castoe, 8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 387 (1906).
17 CJ.S. 795 (1939); PRossEm, ToRTs 706, 739 (1941).
"VoLD, SALS §§ 140 et seq. (1931).
a' Cleveland Linseed Oil Co. v. A.F. Buchanan & Sons, 120 Fed. 906 (2d Cir. 1903);
Hetteshimer v. Swisher, 7 Ohio L. Rep. 629 (Licking Com. Pl. 1909).
'Hetteshimer v. Swisher, 7 Ohio L Rep. 629 (Licking Com. P1. 1909); Borg v.
Downing, 221 Wis. 463, 266 N.W. 182 (1936).
'
T Stovall v. Newell, 158 Ore. 206, 75 P.2d 346 (1938).
"DeLassalle v. Guildford, [1901] 2 K.B. 215 (CA.).
20Ibid.
' Swayne v. Waldo, 73 Iowa 749, 33 N.W. 78 (1887) (warranty as to the quality
of land).
' Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
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warranties of any type, and recovery on a warranty theory is limited to proof
of an express warranty.22 In the sale of a house not yet finished or in the
process of construction, the implied warranties inherent in the sale thereof
can best be understood by reference to a fact situation present in the mer-
chandising of new houses.
It is common today for a purchaser to inspect a builder's "moder' or
"display" home, select a choice lot, and then enter into a contract for the
purchase of a house on the selected lot. The house may be in the process
of construction or perhaps not yet started. As previously noted, any such
agreement may be said to consist of both a contract for the sale of real estate
and a building contract.
It is a general principle of law that any person who holds himself out
as specially qualified to perform work of a particular character impliedly
warrants that the work which he undertakes shall be of proper workman-
ship.13 It is also fundamental in the law of building contracts that one con-
tracting to build a structure for a particular purpose impliedly warrants that
the structure when completed shall be reasonably fit for its intended use.24
These two principles have led to the rule that in the sale of a house to be
constructed or in the process of construction there are implied warranties by
the vendor that the house shall be built in a reasonably efficient and work-
manlike manner and that the house when completed shall be reasonably fit
for the intended habitation. 25 Although these are two separate warranties,
the courts in allowing recovery have attached no significance to the dis-
tinction.26
Performance in a "workmanlike manner" means that work which would
be considered skillful by one capable of judging such work objectively in any
place, not necessarily that which is acceptable in the particular community
involved.2 7 A breach of the implied warranty of proper workmanship has
been held to exist where a chimney failed to carry out smoke because of the
'See note 2 supra. Contra: De Armas v. Gray, 10 La. Rep. 575 (1837) (an im-
plied warranty was recognized in the sale of a completed house). This case illus-
trates the absence of caveat emptor from the civil law.
' Somerby v. Tappman, Wright 229 (Ohio 1833); Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887,
59 S.E.2d 78 (1950); 17 CJ.S. 781 (1939).
'Florida Ry. v. Smith, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 255 (1874); Hall v. MacLead, 191
Va. 665, 62 S.E.2d 42 (1950); 9 C.J. 745 (1916).
'Allen v. Reichert, 73 Ariz. 91, 234 P.2d 818 (1951); Schindler v. Green, 7 Cal.
Unrep. Cas. 233, 82 Pac. 631 (1905); Jose-Balz Co. v. DeWitt, 93 Ind. App. 672,
176 N.E. 864 (1931); Minemount Realty Co. v. Ballentine, 111 N.J. Eq. 398, 162
At. 594 (1932); Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
=' Query: Under what facts will a defect in a house result in a breach of one of the
implied warrantees without also being a breach of the other. Cf. Younger v. Caro-
selli, 251 Mich. 533, 232 N.W. 378 (1930); Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd.,
[1931] 2 K.B. 113.
' Anderson v. Whittaker, 11 So. 919 (Ala. 1893); Fitzgerald v. La Porte, 64 Ark.
[Summer
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inadequate and odd sized flues;28 where exterior stucco peeled off soon after
completion of the house;29 where floors were uneven and windows out of
plumb;30 where improper concrete footings under foundation walls resulted
in cracked plaster, ill fitting doors and opening of joints in the woodwork;3 1
where a concrete garage floor cracked because poured in frosty weather; 2
where second story windows were not placed in line with the first story
windows;3 3 and where a foundation built over a tree stump cracked in set-
tling.34
Although a builder impliedly warrants to perform in a workmanlike
manner he is bound to exercise only ordinary care and skill and is not an
insurer against loss due to latent defects in the materials used in construc-
tion." In Flannery v. St. Louis Architectural Iron Co. 6 the plaintiff, a
builder, voluntarily reconstructed a garage which collapsed as a result of a
latent defect in a welded supporting post. In a suit against the supplier of
the post it was held that, since the builder was not liable for defects in
material which could not be discovered by the exercise of ordinary care, he
was under no duty to reconstruct the garage and therefore could not recover
the loss from the supplier. Similarly, where it is shown that the cause of
uneven floors in a house is warpage due to a latent defect in the lumber,
rather than inefficient workmanship, the builder is not liable3
A breach of the implied warranty of fitness for intended habitation or
use has been held to exist where dampness penetrated the house;38 where a
34, 40 S.W. 261 (1897); Holland v. Rhoades, 56 Ore. 206, 106 Pac. 779 (1910).
Contra: Carter v. Adams, Wright 471 (Ohio 1833).
' Somerby v. Tappan, Wright 570 (Ohio 1834); Somerby v. Tappan, Wright 229
(Ohio 1833).
' Jose-Balz Co. v. DeWitt, 93 Ind. App. 672, 176 N.E. 864 (1931).
'Anderson v. Whittaker, 11 So. 919 (Ala. 1893).
" Sparling v. Housman, 96 Cal. App.2d 159, 214 P.2d 837 (1950).
'Minemount Realty Co. v. Ballentine, 111 N.J. Eq. 398, 162 At. 594 (1932).
'This being a small dwelling, the misplacement of the windows is not a trivial
matter. Defendant is as much entitled to have the windows in his little home
placed perfectly and in a workmanlike manner as is the owner of a more imposing
structure." Schindler v. Green, 82 Pac. 631, 633, (Cal. 1905).
"Raab v. Beatty, 96 Pa. Super. 574 (1929).
'Wisconsin Red Pressed Brick Co. v. Hood, 67 Minn. 329, 69 N.W. 1091 (1897)
(builder not liable for latent defects in brick purchased from a third person sup-
plier).
S194 Mo. App. 555, 185 S.W. 760 (1916).
'Whaley v. Milton Construct. & Supply Co., 241 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. App. 1951).
'Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 KB. 113 (court spoke of both the
implied warranty of proper workmanship and that of fitness for intended habitation).
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roof leaked;39 and where a driveway was too narrow for the passage of a
car 40
At what stage in the process of construction is a house so far complete
as to preclude any implied warranties and bring its sale under the rule of
caveat emptor? In the English case of Perry v. Sharon Development Co.,
Ltd., ' where the plastering of two rooms and the installation of some plumb-
ing fixtures remained to be done, the court stated that so long as the vendor's
workmen are on the job the house remains one still in the process of comple-
tion, and a purchaser is entitled to the implied warranties of proper work-
manship and fitness for intended habitation. Although no American case in
point in regard to the sale of a house has been found, where leased premises
were sufficiently completed to allow inspection an Arkansas court rejected
the implied warranty of fitness for intended use 4 2 While the Arkansas case
indicates that a warranty will be implied only against defects caused by work
done subsequent to the contract and the presence of which could not be as-
certained by an inspection, it is suggested that the policy of the Perry case
be followed in extending, rather than restricting, the application of the
doctrine of implied warranty.
Mere acceptance of a house and assuming possession thereof with knowl-
edge of defects does not amount to a waiver of the cause of action for breach
of warranty.43
Damages recoverable for a breach of implied warranty have been held
to include not only the cost of correcting the defect but also consequential
damages such as the loss of use and enjoyment of the premises,"4 injury to
household furniture45 and injury to other articles normally present within
the building. 6
"Kuitems v. Covell, 104 Cal. App.2d 482, 231 P.2d 552 (1951).
'Younger v. Caroselli, 251 Mich. 533, 232 N.W. 378 (1930).[1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.).
'Oliver v. Hartzell, 170 Ark. 512, 280 S.W. 979 (1926). A lease of hotel space
for a barber shop was entered into at a time when the plastering and the cement floor
of the premises were not yet completed. The defect complained of was seepage of
water through the floor. The court held that since at the time of inspection by the
lessee the work on the building had progressed sufficiently near to completion to
afford an opportunity to the lessee to ascertain its suitableness for the intended use,
the lease came under the rule of caveat emptor.
" Sparling v. Housman, 96 Cal. App.2d 159 214 P.2d 837 (1950); Stewart v. Ful-
ton, 31 Mo. 59 (1860). But Cf. Glass v. Weisner, 172 Kan. 133, 238 P.2d 712
(1951). (Where the owner expressly assumed the risk as to a particular method
of bracing a building, it was held a waiver of the builder's implied warranty).
Somerby v. Tappan, Wright 229 (Ohio 1833).
"Ibid.
"Flint Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491, 79 N.E. 503 (1906); J.D. Young Co. v.
McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
[Summer
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3. Negligenc 4T7
As a general rule the grantor of an existing house, new or used, is not
liable either to purchaser or to third persons for personal injuries resulting
from a defective or dangerous condition of the premises; 48 however, he is
under a duty to disclose concealed defects involving an unreasonable risk of
harm of which he has knowledge.49 The fact that the defect on the premises
is a violation of some statute or ordinance has been held not to constitute
negligence per se. 0 If the defective condition cdnstitutes a public or pri-
vate nuisance, however, the grantor continues subject to liability for a rea-
sonable length of time after the transfer of ownership."1
4. Fraud
A vendor's intentional misrepresentation as to the quality or condition
of a house if justifiably relied on by the purchaser is actionable fraud.5 2
•Thus, where the defendant, having knowledge of a leaky roof, assured the
purchaser that all leaks had been fixed and that the house was in perfect
condition, it was held fraudulent." Mere silence when there is a duty to
speak may amount to passive concealment and subject a vendor to liability
for fraud. 4
If fraud can be shown in the purchase of real estate, the purchaser can
affirm the contract and sue for money damages, 5 or he may assert his remedy
by way of defense to an action for the balance of the purchase price5 6
4 For a more comprehensive treatment of this subject see PROssmR, TORTS § 80
(1941).
" Combow v. Kansas City Ground Inv. Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S.W. 2d 539 (1949)
(plaster falling from ceiling); Otto v. Bolton & Norris, [1936] 2 K.B. 46 (plaster
falling from ceiling); Mayer v. Winnepeg Elec. Co., [1948] 4 D.L.R. 301 (Man.
K.B.) (purchaser's child killed from contact with exposed electric wire); RESrA'r-
MENT, TORTS §§ 351, 352 (1938); 8 A.L.R. 2d 218; 41 AJ.IL 842. No personal
injury cases have been found in which the house was still in the process of con-
struction at the time of purchase and the cause of action brought was in negligence.
"Kilmer v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908 (1930); RESTATEMENT TORTS §
353 (1938).
' Stone v. Heyman Bros., 124 Cal. App. 46, 12 P.2d 126 (1932); Mercer v. Meinel,
290 IIL. 395, 125 N.E. 288 (1919); Upp v. Darner, 150 Iowa 403, 130 N.W. 409
(1911).
" Rufo v. South Brooklyn Say. Bank, 268 App. Div. 1057, 52 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1945);
Kibiuk v. Windsor Residences, 183 N.Y. Misc. 499, 52 N.Y.S.2d 326, aff'd in pfart,
184 N.Y. Misc. 186, 54 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1944). Contra: McQuillan v. Clark Thread
Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 409, 172 At. 370 (1934).
"Herzog v. Capitol Co., 27 Cal.2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945); Blackman v. Howes,
82 Cal. App.2d 275, 185 P.2d 1019 (1947); Macart v. San Joaquin Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 45 Cal. App.2d 395, 114 P.2d 395 (1941).
" Herzog v. Capitol Co., 24 Cal.2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945).
"See Vendt v. Duenke, 210 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Mo. App. 1948) (house was built
on fill dirt without footings).
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Where the sale of a house is negotiated through a third party real estate
agent hired by the vendor, there is a split of authority on the question of
the vendor's liability in damages for the fraudulent misrepresentations of
his agent The better view seems to be that the purchaser can not main-
tain an action for damages against the vendor, the rationale being that the
agent was without authority to make misrepresentations." However, most
courts agree that the defrauded purchaser is at least entitled to a rescission
of the contract, the vendor not being allowed to retain the fruits of his
agent's fraud. 58 Since fraud is never presumed or imputed, 9 and proof of
all its elements is usually difficult, the purchaser should not overlook the
possibility of recovery based on warranty. 0
PROBLEMS IN PROOF
In seeking to impose liability upon the vendor of a defective house, the
plaintiff purchaser may encounter two distinct problems in proof -the
Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule.61
1. Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds requires contracts for the sale of an interest in land
to be in writing. 2 Since an existing completed house when attached to
land is realty,83 any contract for the sale thereof is within the purview of the
Statute of Frauds." However, as previously noted, the purchaser of a house
in the process of construction enters into two severable contracts, one for
the sale of the lot and one for the building of the house. The latter, a build-
ing contract, is one which merely relates to land and is not the sale of at; in
Kaluzok v. Brisson, 27 Cal.2d 760, 167 P.2d 481 (1946); Welch v. Reeves, 142
Neb. 171, 5 N.W.2d 275 (1942); Weigel v. Cook, 237 N.Y. 136, 142 N.E. 444
(1923).
" Freggens v. Clark, 100 N.J. Eq. 389, 135 Ad. 681 (1927).
'Light v. Chandler Improvement Co., 33 Ariz. 101, 261 Pac. 96 (1928); Dieterle
v. Bourne, 57 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio App. 1943). Contra: Taylor v. Wilson, 44 Ohio
App. 100, 183 N.E. 541 (1932). See also note, 57 A.L.R. 112; LATrY, INTRO-
DuCnON TO BusiNFss AssocrATioNs 259 et seq. (1951).
'Light v. Chandler Improvement Co., 33 Ariz. 101, 261 Pac. 96 (1928); Loma
Vista Development v. Johnson, 180 S.W.2d 922 (Texas Civ. App. (1943); RE-
STATEMENT, AGENcY § 259 (1933).
Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946).
'In Vendt v. Duenke, 210 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. App. 1948), the plaintiff may well
have recovered had he alleged a breach of the implied warranty inherent in the sale
of a house under construction.
For a discussion differentiating the two problems see 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTs 227
(1951).
" RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 178, 193 (1932); e.g., OHIo GEN. CODE § 8620.
"Kutter v. Smith, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 491 (1865); 22 AM. JtR. 778 (1939).
"Long v. White, 42 Ohio St. 59 (1884).
[Summer
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terest therein. Therefore, although the house when completed will be real
estate, the Statute of Frauds has no application to a purchaser seeking re-
covery for the alleged breach of an oral building contract or oral warranty
collateral thereto.65
2. Parol Evidence Rule
In the sale of any house, the practical inexpediency of reducing all the
details into one written contract often results in many verbal understand-
ings to which a purchaser is subsequently forced to resort. If there exists
an integrated written contract any evidence of additional promises or war-
ranties, oral60 or written, 7 is generally held to be excluded by the parol
evidence rule. However, parol evidence is always admissible to show
fraud,"' a collateral contract 9 or that the written document is but a partial
-integration of the entire agreement.7"
In what would seem to be but a specific application of the parol evi-
dence rule many courts have stated that all prior negotiations both oral and
written are merged in an executed deed.' However, most of these courts
go on to hold that as a practical matter a formal document such as a deed is
usually only a partial integration, anad that collateral agreements, not a part
of the main purpose of the transaction, which show an intent that they
should not be merged into the deed are, therefore, not extinguished by an
acceptance of the deed.V 2
Although few courts have expressly noted the distinction, the nature of
the written document involved, either a written contract of sale or a formal
conveyance of real estate, is an important factor in determining the ad-
'Haynes v. Morton, 32 Tenn. App. 251, 222 S.W.2d 389 (1949); Scales v. Wiley,
68 Vt. 39, 33 At. 771 (1895); Cf. Laurel Realty Co. v. Himmelfarb, 191 Md. 462,
62 A.2d. 263 (1948) (court rejected the defense of the Statute of Frauds by apply-
ing the doctrine of part performance); 2 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS 1422 (1936).
'Eastman v. Britton, 175 App. Div. 476, 162 N.Y. Supp. 587 (1916); Warren v.
Pulley, 193 Ol. 88, 141 P.2d 288 (1943) (in these cases the courts rejected testi-
mony of an oral warranty as to the basement and foundation walls of a house); RE-
STATEMENT, CONmTACTS § 237, Illustration 2 (1932).
"Clay v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1934).
'
3Hansen v. Daniel Hays Co., 152 Minn. 222, 188 N.W. 317 (1922); Bauer v.
Taylor, 96 N.W. 268 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1903); Note, 56 A.L.R. 13 (1927).
'Roof v. Jerd, 102 Vt. 129, 146 Ad. 250 (1929); RFSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 240 (1)(a) (1932).
703 CORBiN, CoNTRAcTs 262 (1951); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 239 (1932);
Note, 70 A.L.R. 746 (1930).
'Haas v. United States Insulating Co., 65 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1946); Note, 84 A.LR.
1008 (1931).
"
2 Corn v. McDowell, 185 S.W. 235 (Mo.App. 1916); Greenfield v. Liberty Con-
struct. Corp., 81 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1948); Price v. Woodward-Brown Realty Co., 190
N.Y. Supp. 561 (1921); 3 CORBiN, CONTRACTS 298 (1951).
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missibility of parol evidence of an oral agreement or warranty. Upon anal-
ysis, the cases disclose four possible fact situations:
Where there is a sale of an existing house, new or used, and there is both
a written contract of sale and a subsequently executed deed, most of the
cases reject parol evidence of an alleged oral agreement or warranty.13
If there is a sale of a house in the process of construction and there is
both a written contract of sale, including a written building contract, and a
subsequently executed deed, the cases are in conflict on the question of the
admissibility of an alleged oral agreement or warranty as to the house or its
manner of completion. While some courts reject the parol evidence,74
others admit it either on the theory that there was a collateral contract, 5 or
that the written contract was only a partial integration. T7
When there is a sale of a house still in the process of construction and
there is both a written contract of sale accompanied by an oral building con-
tract and a subsequently executed deed, most courts hold that the building
contract, including any warranties, may be shown by parol evidence be-
cause it is a collateral contract.77
Where there is only an oral contract for the sale of a house (completed
or otherwise) followed by an executed deed, most courts allow parol evi-
dence of agreements or warranties on the ground that the deed is but a par-
tial integration of the entire contract."
Since an implied warranty is one imposed by law apart from the contract,
facts raising an implied warranty may be proved by any evidence for the
parol evidence rule has no application.79 This is so despite acceptance of
the deed.80
While it has been suggested that, if a false promise or statement would
make the seller liable as a warrantor, evidence of such statement should be
admitted even though the contract was reduced to writing,81 the writer sub-
' Tufford v. Gordon, 217 Mich. 658, 187 N.W. 264 (1922); Ball v. Grady, 267
N.Y. 470, 196 N.E. 402 (1935).
T
'Eastman v. Britton, 175 App. Div. 476, 162 N.Y. Supp. 587 (1916); Warren
v. Pulley, 193 Old. 88, 141 P.2d 288 (1943).
"Whaley v. Milton Construct. & Supply Co., 241 S.W.2d 23, (Mo. App. 1951);
Sale v. Figg, 164 Va. 402, 180 S.E. 173 (1935).
"
8Laurel Realty Co. v. Himmelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A.2d 263 (1948); Luck v.
Wood, 144 Va. 355, 132 S.E. 178 (1926).
'*Blahnik v. Small Farms Improvement Co., 181 Cal. 379, 184 Pac. 661 (1919);
Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948); Haynes v. Morton, 32
Tenn. App. 251, 222 S.W.2d 389 (1949).
"Corn v. McDowell, 185 S.W. 235 (Mo. App. 1916); Deassale v. Guildford
[1901] 2 K.B. 215 (C.A.).
"3 CO RBIN, CoNTRAcrs 287 (1951).
'Raab v. Beatty, 96 Pa. Super 574 (1929); Lawrence v. Cassell, [1930] 2 K.B.
83 (CA.).
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mits that extended imposition of an implied warranty in the sale of an exist-
ing new house would in many cases obviate any such direct violation of the
parol evidence rule.
PuRCHAE'S RiGHT To RESCIND
As an alternative to the recovery of money damages the purchaser of a
defective house may rescind the contract of sale and recover the purchase
price paid thereunder, where there has been misrepresentation,82 mistake8 s
or a substantial breach" by the vendor. The courts have traditionally con-
sidered rescission as an equitable remedy and have been reluctant to extend
its application. The criterion as established by the better reasoned cases
seems to be that rescission should be granted only in the instance where the
house in question is substantially incapable of being utilized for the in-
tended purpose and where the awarding of money damages, although com-
pensatory of the defect, would involve much hardship on the part of the
purchaser in completing the house as contemplated.8 5
As illustrative of this judicial attitude, the results in the following two
cases may be compared. In McMahon v. Cooper," the plaintiff contracted
to purchase from the defendant a lot upon which there was an unfinished
'house in the process of construction. In the written contract of sale it was
stipulated that the defendant was to complete the house in a workmanlike
manner. Among the defects apparent upon completion of the house were
the absence of cupboards above the sink, the absence of closets in the bed-
room, crumbling cement work and inadequate exterior paint In granting
a rescission because there was not a substantial compliance with the contract,
the court noted the hardship that would be placed upon the purchaser in
properly completing the house.
In Labar v. Lindstrom87 the plaintiff sought rescission on the ground
that there was misrepresentation. The defect complained of was a leaky roof,
the repair of which was a minor and relatively inexpensive job. The basis
83 WILISTON, CONTRAcrs 1850 (1936).
"Freggens v. Clark, 100 N.J. Eq. 389, 135 At. 681 (1927) (misrepresentation as
to dampness in basement of house). That the law recognizes an innocent as well as
a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact as a ground for rescission see 5
WILLSTON, CoNT A crs § 1500 (1936).
"Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 219 Mich. 643, 189 N.W. 923 (1923); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 1557 (1936).
"McMahon v. Cooper, 70 Idaho 139, 212 P.2d 657 (1949). For breach of war-
ranty see note 91, infra.
"McMahon v. Cooper, 70 Idaho 139, 212 P. 2d 657 (1949); Labar v. Lindstrom,
158 Minn. 453, 197 N.W. 756 (1924); cf. McMillan v. American Suburban Co.,
136 Tenn. 53, 188 S.W. 615 (1916).
u70 Idaho 139, 212 P.2d 657 (1949).
'T158 Minn. 453, 197 N.W. 756 (1924).
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of the court's decision in allowing money damages and refusing rescission
was that a rescission in equity depends upon the materiality of the breach
or misrepresentation.
Although the rule at common law was otherwise,81 in most American
jurisdictions today rescission will be granted in the proper case for breach
bf warranty in the sale of chattels.8 9 It is suggested that the above rule be
extended to the sale of houses and that rescission be granted for a breach of
warranty, express or implied, regarding some defect in a house °
Where the purchaser has taken possession of the house, he is allowed
rescission only upon payment to the vendor of an amount equal to the
value of the use of the premises during his period of occupancy." Accord-
ing to the more liberal and practical view, this amount need not be tendered
as a prerequisite to rescission, but may be adjusted by the court in awarding
final restitution to the purchaser.9 2
In the same respect that the purchaser is accountable for rent, the vendor,
in addition to a restoration of the purchase price, is liable for interest on
the purchase price,9 3 amounts paid for taxes 4 and improvements placed on
the land by the purchaser.95
When, in a given case, the purchaser has established a right to rescind, a
valuable aid in gaining restitution is the enforcement of a vendee's lien in
equity. By the use of this device, the purchaser may impress a lien against
the land and thus assure restitution of all moneys due him."
CONCLUSION
The subject of warranty has received much attention within the build-
ing industry itself. The National Association of Home Builders has pro-
' At common law a purchaser could not rescind an executed contract of sale for
breach of warranty because of the theory that the warranty was collateral to the
main contract, and therefore its breach did not constitute a failure of consideration
under the contract.
"Alberti v. Jubb, 204 Cal. 325, 267 Pac. 1085 (1928); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1462 (1936).
The writer has found no cases exactly in point, i.e. where suit for rescission was
brought for breach of warranty regarding some defect in a house. Cf. Freggens v.
Clark, 100 N.J. Eq. 389, 135 Ad. 681 (1927).
"Blrod-Oas Home Bldg. Co. v. Mensor, 120 Cal. App. 485, 8 P.2d 171 (1932);
Skinner v. Scholes, 49 N.D. 181, 229 N.W. 114 (1930).
"McMahon v. Cooper, 70 Idaho 139, 212 P.2d 657 (1949); Chase v. Wolgamot
137 Iowa 128, 114 N.W. 614 (1908).
" Skinner v. Scholes, 59 N.D. 181, 229 N.W. 114 (1930); cf. French v. Freeman,
191 Cal. 579, 217 Pac. 515 (1923).
" Skinner v. Scholes, 59 N.D. 181, 229 N.W. 114 (1930).
'McMahon v. Cooper, 70 Idaho 139, 212 P.2d 657 (1949); Skinner v. Scholes,
59 N.D. 181, 229 N.W. 114 (1930).
0 Ibid.
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posed a standard written warranty to be given by builders to the purchaser of
a new house, but it is far from universally accepted even by the members of
the association itself.9 7 The fact that this warranty is usually given, if at all,
after the consumation of the contract of sale may raise the technical objec-
tion of lack of consideration or detrimental reliance.P8
The federal government is an important participant in home building
and selling today. The two federal agencies most directly connected with
new housing and the problem under consideration are the Federal Housing
Administration and the Veterans Administration. These agencies function
primarily in the capacity of a surety. As a prerequisite to the FHA's or the
VA's becoming the insurer of a loan made to the purchaser of a new house,
certain practices and standards of construction are required. To assure com-
pliance with the standards as established by agency regulations, inspections
are periodically made during the process of construction. Although these
precautions in themselves are beneficial to the ultimate purchaser, there are
at present no federal regulations imposing a warranty upon the builder of
a house on which there is a federally insured loan.9 9 However, the power
of FHA and the VA to refuse to insure future loans on the houses of an
irresponsible builder is often effective in persuading the builder to remedy
any defects, so the purchaser of a new house under an FFHA or VA insured
loan is in a somewhat protected position.
Although not recognized by the law at present, there is a distinction be-
tween the sale of an existing new house and the sale of a used house. Many
of the common defects in'a house are of such a nature as to become apparent
only at quite some time subsequent to completion of the house. For ex-
ample, the natural settling of a house, changes in temperature and exposure to
the elements are often the processes which reveal defects in construction
such as improper footings, inadequate waterproofing of basement walls and
leaky roofs. Thus, the purchaser of an older house which has been sub-
jected to these processes can ascertain such defects in construction more
readily than can the purchaser of a new house. This, coupled with the
fact that used houses are almost invariably sold by the owner rather than
The main objections raised to any standard warranty are the different building
practices in various sections of the country and the different local laws applicable to
such warranty. The NAHB realizing this has since recommended a Home Owners
Service Policy which, although well intended, seems legally inadequate. See Brock-
land, Why A Service Policy, 6 N.A.H.B. CORRELATOR 2 (September 1952).
"Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose, PRO-
cEEDINGs, AmEmIcAN BAR AsSOiATION SECrION op REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRusr LAW 10 (1952).
However, the local VA in the New Jersey district, for example, requires the builder
to give a guaranty of the roof and basement as a condition of VA approval. See
Veterans Administration Newark Regional Office, Loan Guaranty Issue No. 121,
February 25, 1952.
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